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THE  CASE  OF  THE  WEST  ALABAMA  CATFISH  INDUSTRY
Henry Kinnucan and Gregory  Sullivan
Abstract  (USDA,  1982  and  1985).  Farm  revenues ob-
tained from  sales of the fish  to  commercial
sIncregasing  tconcentration  in  food  pro-  processing plants have increased steadily since
cessing has important economic implications  1976  exceeding  $100  million  in  1984
for  agricultural  producers  and  consumers.,  i 
This  paper  addresses  the  issue  by  focusing  (USDA,  1985).  In early  1985,  a national fast This  paper  addresses  the  issue  by focusing  chain  contracted with the  industry  to
on a case where pure monopsony  conditions  food  chain  contracted  with the  industry  to
appear  to  hold-catfish  processing  in West  purchase  54 million pounds of processed fish appear  to hold-catfish  processing  in  West
Alabama.  Farm-level  impacts  of  the  market  over  a  15-month  period  (Jensen).  Based  on
power imbalance are described via a six equa-  a  1984 industry base of 154  million pounds
tion  theoretical  model.  Results  show  price  (USDA,  1985),  this action alone represented
elasticity of farm  supply governing the  eco-  a-28  percent  increase  in  annual  processor
nomic  incentive  to  the  processor  for  ex-  purchases.
ploiting its market power: less (more)  elastic  A potential  problem  facing this  emerging
supply  implies  greater  (lesser)  divergence  industry is an apparent imbalance  of market
between  competitive  and monopsony  price.  power  between  catfish  producers  and  the
The theoretical  model is operationalized  us-  processing  sector.  Currently,  some  14  com-
ing an indirect procedure recently suggested  mercial  sized  processors  service  the  indus-
by  Houck  for  estimating  farm  level  supply  try's  1,000  producers  (USDA,  1982  and
elasticities. Based on these supply elasticities  1985).  A  1981  study  of  catfish  processors
and  historical  prices,  the  model  predicts  a  concluded that the industry "is characterized
12-35  percent potential  reduction  in prices  structurally by a high degree  of market con-
received  by  West  Alabama  producers  as  a  centration"  (p.  v)  with  five  of the  nine  re-
result of market  power  imbalance.  porting firms handling 98 percent of the total
pounds processed (Miller et al.). Further evi-
Key words:  monopsony,  price  exploitation,  dence  of  the  oligopsonistic  nature  of  the
price  discrimination,  supply  industry  was  the  existence  of  a  "  . . . high
elasticity,  welfare  loss,  catfish.  degree  of  mutual  interdependence  . ..
A farm  enterprise  gaining importance  in  among  the  firms  in their  pricing  and  other
the South is the pond culture of catfish.  Since  business  policies  (Miller  et  al.,  p.  18).  Fi-
1963,  the  number  of acres  devoted to com-  nally, a chronic problem of excess processing
mercial catfish production has increased from  capacity (Russell;  Miller et al.) coupled with
2,400  to 23,000  (Russell;  USDA).  Fish proc-  the  apparent existence  of "  ...  major econ-
essed by commercial-sized  plants (those with  omies  of  size  in  [catfish]  processing..."
over  2,000  lb./day capacity)  more  than  tri-  (Fuller  and  Dillard,  p.  18)  suggest  even
pled  in  volume  between  1980  and  1984  greater industry concentration  over  time.'
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'Using  an economic-engineering  approach  to estimate  investment  requirements and processing costs  associated
with  different  sized  catfish  processing  plants,  Fuller  and Dillard  found  operating  costs  (on  a  per pound  basis)
declining  29  percent  when  plant  capacity  was  increased  from  32,000  pounds  per  day  (one  shift  capacity)  to
160,000.
15The  degree  of competiveness  in  the  pro-  in the market  under monopsony is less than
cessing sector is important to the catfish pro-  under  perfect competition,  implying  higher
ducer because  historically  about 80 percent  prices to consumers and a social welfare loss
of the farm output is sold to local processing  due  to  reduced  trade.3 The paper  proceeds
plants  (USDA,  1982).  Two other market  op-  by first  developing these  implications of the
tions  typically  available  to  the  catfish  pro-  model.  An attempt is then made  to quantify
ducer are direct sales to specialty restaurants  the  price  exploitation  potential  of monop-
and  fee  fishing.  Although  these  outlets  are  sonistic catfish processing by using neoclass-
attractive in that the farmer receives a higher  ical economic theory to indirectly derive the
price, volume is generally insufficient to make  needed  supply  elasticities.  An expression  is
these alternatives  economically viable in the  derived  to  quantify  the  potential  welfare
long run for the  individual  producer.  losses  of monopsony  to  West  Alabama  pro-
The  primary  objective  of this  paper  is to  ducers.  The  paper  concludes  with  a  brief
quantify  the  potential  economic  impact  of  discussion of limitations  and implications  of
market  power  imbalance  on  catfish  produc-  the analysis.
ers. The problem is approached by applying
a mathematical  model  of monopsony  behav-  THE  MODEL
ior to a segment of the catfish industry located
in West Alabama. This portion of the industry  The nature of the supply response in catfish
is  chosen  for  study because  the  market  re-  production  plays  a  key  role in  determining
cently became  monopsonistic with 225 pro-  the  degree to  which  the  processor  in West
ducers in a five county area being dependent  Alabama  can profit  by exploiting  its  market
on  a  single  processor  to  market  their  fish  advantage.  This  finding  can  be  expressed
(Mims  and  Sullivan).  Hence,  a  pure  mo-  mathematically  with  a  simple  six  equation
nopsony model is appropriate  and the analy-  model.4 First, the catfish processing  industry
sis is simplified.2 Because  supply elasticities  may  be  viewed  as  using  two  inputs:  farm-
are a key component of the economic  model  raised catfish  (a)  and other purchased inputs
and  empirical  estimates  of such parameters  (b)  necessary for the production of fresh and
at the farm level are unavailable, a secondary  frozen market-ready fish (x). The production
objective is to show how neoclassical theory  function  for the processing  industry  is:
can be used to obtain insights into the nature
of supply  response  characteristic  of an  in-  ()  x  (a,  ).
dustry when elaborate  econometric  analysis  The  (inverse)  supply functions  for these in-
is either not warranted  or inappropriate  due  puts  are:
to data  limitations or other reasons.
The economic model yields three essential  (2)  Pa  =  g  (a,  Z)
results, each dependent upon the magnitude  for the  equation for catfish supply,  and
of the  farm  level  supply  elasticity:  (1)  the
price  exploitation  potential  of the  monop-  (3)  a  =  (b,  T)
sonist increases  (decreases)  as the farm level  as the supply function to the processing firm
supply  elasticity  gets  smaller  (larger),  (2)  of inputs  other than  catfish.  The variables  Z
producers  selling to  a monopsonistic  buyer  and T represent exogenous supply shifters of
receive  less  than  the value  of the  marginal  the respective  functions.  Specifically,  Z may
product of their-output,  i.e.,  the monopson-  be thought  of as  disease  problems  affecting
ist's  price  is  lower  than  the  perfectly  com-  catfish supply and T as  a specific tax on one
petitive price, and (3)  the quantity exchanged  or  more  of the  inputs  embodied  in  b  (say
2Actually,  a potential  complication  exists  because  the  West Alabama  processing  plant  is owned by  a national
food manufacturer  which has larger  plants  located in Mississippi  (the major catfish  production area  in the United
States).  The  extent to which the Alabama  plant is autonomous  with respect to  pricing and procurement policies
or  is  considered  by  the  parent  company  as  part  of a  multi-plant  corporate  strategy  (Scherer  et  al.,  1975)  is
unknown.  For the purposes  of this paper,  it is assumed that the plant will behave as a pure  monopsonist.  Support
for this  assumption  is  derived  from  Willard  F. Mueller's  1983  address  to  the  American  Agricultural  Economic
Association in which he stated (pp. 856-60)  . .."our case studies and cross-sectional analysis in food manufacturing
and grocery retailing  reveal  that the possession  of great power invites  its use."
3A  fourth  implication,  not  developed  in  this  paper  because  of space  considerations,  is  an  incentive  for  the
processor  to  practice  price  discrimination  if  catfish  supply  elasticities  vary  seasonally.  A  good  reference  for
developing this  implication  is Hadar,  pp.  107-8.  (Also,  see footnote  6.) 4This  model  is adapted from  the  one developed  by Gardner to  explain marketing  margin  behavior  in the food
industry.  Although approaching  the  problem  of monopsony pricing  in this manner adds to the  complexity of the
analysis,  it  has  the didactic  virtue  of clarifying variable  definition  and other more  subtle,  but important,  aspects
of the  problem.
16taxes  on  labor)  that  makes  the  input  more  The assumption of fixed prices in the prod-
expensive  to the firm.  uct  and  b  factor  markets  simplifies  the  dif-
The demand equation for processed catfish  ferential calculus  necessary to show the new
is:  equilibrium  under  monopsony.  Because  the
(4)  x  =  D  (P  ,  N),  West Alabama catfish processing plant is buy-
ing a  large  quantity of catfish exchanged  in where  Px is the price the  processor receives where  PX  is  the price the processor  receives  the local market,  it must expect a change  in
for the  fish  it sells  and  N  is  an  exogenous  c  the price  per unit  of fish when the  quantity demand shifter  such  as  population  growth. exchanged  varies.  In  other  words,  the  pro- If perfect  competition  prevailed  in  both If  perfect  competition  prevailed  in  both  cessing  firm faces  an upward  sloping supply product  and  factor  markets,  the  processor proc  a.  fcurve  for  catfish  (catfish  producers  are  as- would  maximize profits by buying quantities  r  r sumed to be pure competitors).  Under these of a  and b that result  in price equaling  the  profit  function  of  the  pro- conditions,  the  profit  function  of the  pro- value  of marginal  product  of both,  i.e.,  cessing  plant is:
(5)  Pa  =  P  · fa
(5)v  ~  J~a=~xfa  ~(7)  rr  =  po  f  (a,  b)  - g  (a,  Z)  a
and  - p*  b  - c,
(6)  Pb  =  Px · fb  where  the  as  yet undefined  variables  rr  and
where  fa  and  fb  are  the partial  derivatives  of  c represent profit and fixed cost, respectively.
x with respect  to  a  and b.  In  this  case,  the  The  first-order  conditions  for  profit  maxi-
above  system  represents  six  equations with  mization  are
six endogenous  variables  (x,  b, a,  Px,  P  P,  Pa).  r
Assuming  downward  sloping demand curves  (8)  =a  Po  *fa  - ga  * a
and supply curves with non-negative  slopes,  - g  (a,  Z)  =  0
a unique equilibrium  exists for given values  and
of the exogenous  variables. 
However,  as  indicated previously,  in West  (9)  =  P  f-  P  =  0,
Alabama perfect competition does not prevail  b
in the factor market for catfish. Although the  where  the  as  yet  undened  term  is  the
processing  plant  faces  competition  in  the  partial derivative  of Pa with respect to a  (see
product  (processed  catfish)  market,  it is the  equation  (2)). With  fixed  prices  for output
sole  effective buyer  of local  pond output of  and  factor  b,  equation  (9)  is  identical  to
the raw fish.  For this reason,  equation  (5)  is  equation  (6),  meaning  that factor b  is  paid
no longer valid. Before making the necessary  the value of its marginal product even though
modification  of the  model  to  accommodate  the  firm  is  a  monopsoist  in  the  live  fish
imperfect  competition,  first  note  that  com-  market.  Thus,  if b  is defined  as labor, theory
petition  does  exist  in the  market  for factor  predicts  that  labor  in  the  processing  plant
b. In fact,  because labor comprises the major  will continue to be paid a competitive wage
component of b for the West Alabama plant,  even  though the firm  has monopsony power
and  labor  is paid  the  minimum  wage  (Jen-  in  the live  catfish  (a)  market
sen),  it is reasonable to assume that the sup-  Comai  eatios  ()  a  ()  a  if
ply  function  for  b  is  perfectly  elastic,  i.e.,
the  plant  can fpurchase  all  the  b  it  wishes  e  ferent picture emerges with respect to factor the  plant  can  purchase  all  the  b  it  wishes taffecting  b  Thus, equation  (3)  may  a.  In  particular,  under  monopsony,  catfish
be  rewritten as:PTueato(3my  producers  are  no  longer  paid  the  value  of
the marginal product of the input they supply
(3')  Pb  =  Pg,  to the processing  firm. Letting  PO  fa  =  VMPa
(value of marginal  product of a)  and making to indicate  that the supply price of b to the  use  of  equation  (2),  it  can  be  seen  from
plant  is  a  parameter  rather  than  a  variable.  equation  ) that
Similarly, because competition is keen in the
product  market,  it  is  reasonable  to  assume  (10)  Pa  - VMP  - ga  * a.
that the firm  must take  P,  as given,  i.e., t  te  Since by assumption the supply curve of cat-
(4')  P,  =- PX.  fish producers  has a positive slope, the quan-
5Historically,  Alabama  contributes  about  12  percent  to  the national  production  of catfish  (Jensen).  Thus,  in a
sense  Alabama  may be  viewed  as  a residual  supplier  of processed  fish,  taking the  retail  (and  by implication,  the
wholesale)  price  as given.
17tity  ga  * a  is  positive,  meaning  that  catfish  p
producers  are likely to receive  a lower price  MFCo
when the  processor  is  a  monopsonist.
That the farm supply  elasticity plays  a key 
role in determining the extent to which prices  So
are lowered  can be seen by first defining the
supply elasticity  as:
da  Pa  1 Pa.
Pa  a  ga  a 
Substituting  e  into equation  (10)  yields: 
VMPa 
(11)  Pa  1
Denoting VMPa  =  PaC,  where  Pac  is the price
catfish farmers  receive when processing  is  a  Do
purely  competitive  industry,  equation  (11) 
can  be rewritten as:1  I 
(12)  a  =  - Figure  1.  Price  Determination  Under Monopsony.
P,  £ a  it does to revenue. This point is determined
Equation  (12)  shows  that  the  price  catfish  by the intersection of the marginal factor cost
farmers  receive under  monopsony  varies  in-  curve  (MFCa)  and the marginal benefit curve
versely  with  the  magnitude  of the  supply  (Da).  In  Figure  1,  the  quantity  of  fish  cor-
elasticity of their output: the less price elastic  responding  to  this  profit  maximizing  point
the  catfish  supply  response,  the  lower  the  is  a',  which  is  less  than  the  amount  of fish
farm price relative to the price received when  purchased when  processing  is  competitive.
the  processing  industry  is  competitive.  In  The  price  farmers  receive  for  this  reduced
other  words,  divergence  between  the  per-  quantity of fish is determined from the supply
fectly competitive  and actual price grows as  curve  and is  Pa'  in the diagram.  Because the
the ability of farmers to adjust production  to  supply  curve  is  upward  sloping,  the  mo-
output price changes  diminishes.  nopsony equilibrium price is lower than the
This result is illustrated graphically in  Fig-  competitive  equilibrium  price  by virtue  of
ure  1. In this diagram,  Sa  represents the farm  the  fact  that  less  fish  are  exchanged  in the
supply schedule  for fish,  Da  is the processor  market under monopsony. It is apparent from
demand function  for fish  under competitive  the  diagram  that as  catfish  supply becomes
conditions,  and  MFCa  is  the  marginal  factor  less  price  elastic  (the  relative  slope  of the
cost of fish  to the  processor  (the  derivative  supply  curve  increases),  the  divergence  be-
of the  supply function  after  multiplying  by  tween the price that farmers  receive for fish
a).  and the perfectly competitive price becomes
The  price  farmers  receive  under  perfect  greater.6
competition  is  determined  by the  intersec-
tion of  Sa  and  Da  which  yields  Pa  in  Figure  AN  APPLICATION  O  THE THEORY
1.  At  competitive  equilibrium,  a'  fish  are
exchanged in the market.  Under monopsony,  Empirical  measures  of supply response to
the  monopsonist  will  maximize  profits  by  output  price  are  needed  to  operationalize
purchasing  fish  at  the  point  where  buying  the  theoretical  model  and  provide  predic-
one more unit of fish adds more to cost than  tions of the extent to which producers might
6An  interesting aspect  of the  model  (not developed  because  of space  considerations)  is  the revelation  that an
incentive may exist for the processing plant to practice price  discrimination by varying the price paid to producers
seasonally.  Briefly,  the argument  is as follows:  because feed conversion  of catfish  differs seasonally due to changes
in water temperature  (Lovell  and Sirikul),  production elasticites  and hence supply elasticities (Houck)  for catfish
are  likely  to also  differ  seasonally  (being  more  elastic  in warm  water seasons  than  cold water  seasons).  Theory
says that the monopsonist will vary the price paid for affected  inputs in response  to changes in the supply elasticity
of those inputs:  offering  a higher  price when  supply elasticites  are  relatively  large  and less when elasticities  are
smaller  (Hadar).  Thus, seasonally  varying catfish  supply elasticities would imply a seasonally varying  price under
monopsony  conditions;  i.e.,  price discrimination  would  occur.  This  potential for  price  discrimination  in  catfish
processing  represents  another important  research  issue  to address  as data  become available.  In  this connection,  a
crucial  hypothesis to  be tested is  whether catfish  supply elasticities  are  uniform  across  seasons.
18find prices falling under the new monopson-  obtain estimates  of aggregate  supply elastic-
istic  market  environment  in  West  Alabama.  ities. Griliches termed supply elasticities ob-
The  newness  of the  industry  and the conse-  tained  in this  way  as  "derived"  elasticities
quent  paucity  of  data  make  conventional  because they were derived from information
econometric  measurements  of  supply  elas-  regarding  production  technology  (as  meas-
ticity impractical  at this juncture.  However,  ured by  production  elasticities)  and  factor
neoclassical  production  theory  provides  an  demands.
avenue for obtaining insights into supply re-  A  disadvantage  of the  Griliches  approach
sponse  providing  certain  assumptions  re-  is that estimates of factor demand elasticities
garding  producer  behavior  and  catfish  are  needed.  Thus,  unless data  or  estimation
production  technology are  accepted.  An  in-  problems  associated  with  estimating  factor
direct method for estimating the supply elas-  demand equations  are less severe than those
ticity is outlined in the following discussion  of estimating  the  supply  equation  directly,
and  is  applied  to  the  West Alabama  catfish  one may be no better  off from  an empirical
industry.  standpoint with the indirect approach. A re-
cent  paper  by  Houck  overcomes  this  limi-
tation. In that paper,  Houck showed that the
A  Derived  Supply Elasticity  for  Catfish  own  price  elasticity  of product  supply  can
Supply response  is ultimately governed by  be expressed  strictly in terms of production
production technology and the ability of the  elasticities  (i.e., without regard to input de-
firm to adjust input use in response to changes  mands)  if the following  conditions  are met:
in relative prices. This fact was illustrated by  (1) producers are profit maximizers,  (2)  pro-
Griliches who showed  that under conditions  duction  elasticities  are  constant throughout
of competitive  equilibrium  and constant fac-  the relevant range of the production surface,
tor  prices,  the  supply  elasticity  (assuming  (3)  the production  process  is characterized
profit  maximization)  is  a  weighted  sum  of  by  non-increasing  returns  to scale,  and  (4)
factor demand  elasticities with weights  cor-  all  relevant  prices  (output  and  factor)  are
responding  to  production  elasticities.  Spe-  given.  In this case, factor demand elasticities
cifically,  the aggregate  supply elasticity  can  (the rlipa in equation  (13))  become equal  to
be written  as:  one  another  and to  the  output supply  elas-
~~~~~~~N  ~ticity  plus one,  i.e.,
(13)  8  =  k, qip,  (15)  nipa =  1+  i=  1,  2,  ...,  N.
Substituting equation (15)  into equation (13)
where  I  is  the  supply  elasticity  of output  yields:
with respect  to product  price,  k is the  pro-
duction  elasticity  corresponding  to  the  ith  (16)  e =
input which tells how output changes as the  1-v
ith  input  is  varied,  %ip  is  the  elasticity  of  where  v =  k,. Note that under the specified
demand for  input i with respect to  product  i
price  (p,),  and  N  is  the  number  of inputs  conditions,  production  elasticities  become
employed  by the firm.  If inputs are paid the  the sole determinant of the supply elasticity;
value  of their  marginal  product,  it  can  be  factor demands  no longer enter into the cal-
shown that in equilibrium:  culation of 8.
Application  of equation  (16)  requires  sat-
(14)  ki=  k  X  isfaction  of  model  assumptions.  A  critical
Pa  a  assumption is the one of constant production
where the numerator represents expenditure  elasticities.  In  examining  the  effects  of  re-
on  the  ith  input  and  the  denominator  rep-  laxing  this  assumption,  Houck  showed  that
resents  total revenue to the firm or industry.  equation  (16)  yields  an upward  bias  in the
In other words, equation (14)  says that factor  estimated  supply elasticity if the assumption
shares can be used  as an estimate  of respec-  fails  to hold,  but  argued that under  general
tive  production  elasticities  under  specified  conditions the bias would likely be small  or
conditions.  Griliches  and  others  after  him  nonexistent.  Evidence  relating  to the  appli-
(e.g.,  Tweeten  and  Quance;  Rayner)  used  cability of the non-increasing returns to scale
equations  (13)  and  (14)  along  with empir-  assumption to catfish production is scant but
ical estimates of input demand elasticities to  suggests  that  the assumption  is valid  (Lace-
19well et al.).  Moreover,  the catfish  enterprise  TABLE  2.  DERIVED  SUPPLY  ELASTICITIES  FOR  CATFISH  BASED
ON  ALTERNATIVE  FACTOR  SHARES  FOR  VARIABLE  INPUTS,
is  management  intensive  and  involves  sub-  ALABAMA,  1981-84
stantial risk (Hansen et al.), lending credence  Factor share  Supply
to the notion that average costs are  likely to  values  elasticity
increase  with  size.  Finally,  the  assumption  .65  1.86
of fixed prices appears valid because Alabama  .75  .........................................  3.00
supplies  less than  12 percent of the nation's  .89  ........................................ 8.10
output  of catfish  (Jensen).
Significance  of equation (16)  for empirical  cost estimates showing the same variable fac-
work  in  supply  analysis  is  summarized  by  tors  representing  about  69  percent  of total
Houck (p.  15): If information about actual  production  costs  in  Mississippi  catfish  op-
costs  in  a  sector is available and if  indi-  erations  (Giachelli  et al.).
vidual profit maximization is assumed, es-  Following Houck's suggestion, these factor
timates of the variousproduction  elasticities  share  values are  used  as  an estimate  of pro-
can be calculated  easilyfrom equation (14).  duction  elasticities  (v).  Supply  elasticities
In profit maximizing equilibrium, each  pro.  corresponding  to the minimum, average,  and
maximum factor share values in Table 1 were duction elasticity is equal to the ratio of  maximum factor share values in Table  were
that input's cost to  the total revenue ob-  computed using equation  (16).9  They range
tained from  the  product.  Wit  empirical  from  1.86 to  8.10,  Table  2.  Although these
estimates of this kind. . .calculation  of the  elasticities appear large, several points should
supply elasticity is possible. In fact, all that  be considered  First, the elasticities are com-
is needed is an estimate of the ratio  of total  puted under the assumption  that the supply
costs of  the relevant variablefactors  to total  of inputs  is perfectly  elastic to totalhe  industry;
revenue.  This latter ratio is an estimate of  i  input  prices  are  fixed.  Should  this  as-
v, which can then be used in equation (16)7.  sumption not hold, i.e.,  should input prices
To apply this procedure,  budget data gen  rise with  increases in factor demands,  equa-
erated by the Alabama Cooperative Extension  tion  (16)  overstates  the  supply  elasticity.
Service  (Crews  and  Jensen)  were  used  to  Thus,  these  elasticities  may be  regarded  as
compute factor shares for the variable inputs  representing  an  upper  bound  on  the  true
used  in  catfish  production.8 Because  factor  supply elasticity. Second, very little is known
shares are sensitive to changes in factor/prod-  about  supply  response  in  aquaculture.  The
uct  price  ratios  and  may  be  influenced  by  rapi  expansion  in  pond  acerage  over  the
economies  of size,  computations were made  past 10 years suggests that output may indeed
for the most recent four year time period and  be  quite responsive to price changes.  Third,
for  a  variety  of  pond  sizes.  Results  show  previous  work shows some tendency for de-
computed  factor shares ranging  from  .65 to  rived  supply  elasticities  to  exceed  conven-
.89  (Table  1),  suggesting  that  in any  given  tion  estimates  (Wipf  and  Bowden).
year  between  65  and  89  percent  of  total  However, for the purpose ofthis analysis,  an
Alabama catfish farm revenues  are consumed  overestimate of the supply elasticity is rather
by variable  costs.  These estimates,  although  innocuous  in that estimates  of the price  ex-
based on synthetic budgets rather than actual  ploitation potential of the  monopsonist will
farm  data,  are  consistent  with  "hard  data"  be conservative  in this  case.  Thus,  if in fact
the  indirect  procedure  provides  a  measure
of the  supply  elasticity  that  is  "too  large",
TABLE  1.  ESTIMATED  FACTOR  SHARES  FOR  VARIABLE  INPUTS  the supl  elstiit  tat  s  oo 
USED  IN CATFISH  PRODUCTION  BY  POND  SIZE,  ALABAMA,  the resulting estimated impact of monopsony
1981-84  on  farm  prices  and  producer  welfare  will
Pond  size  (acres)'  represent a  lower bound.
Year  1  5  10  20
1981  .....................  .80  .77  .77  .72
1982  .....................  .89  .86  .85  .82  The Monopsony  Price
1983  .....................  .83  .80  .80  .75
1984  .....................  .70  .67  .67  .65  With estimates  of the supply elasticity for
'Assumes  a stocking rate  of 3,500  fish per acre.  catfish in hand, it is now possible to quantify
Source:  Crews and Jensen.  the extent of the  market power held by the
7Numbers in parentheses  were added  and they refer to  equations  in the  text.
sVariable inputs are defined to include the following factors:  fingerlings, feed,  chemicals,  hired labor, electricity,
fuel,  lubricants,  equipment  repair,  and interest  on operating capital.
9The  average  value  is  based  on  the  10-  and  20-acre  pond  figures  only  because  these  appear  to represent  the
most economically  viable  pond  sizes  in the long run  for West Alabama producers  (Hansen et al.).
20West  Alabama  catfish  processing  plant.  Re-  as  monopsony replaces  competition.  In Fig-
writing equation  (12)  as:  ure 1, monopsony diminishes producers' sur-
~~~p ~~C  ~plus  by an amount equal to the shaded portion
(12')  Pa  -P  of the diagram.
1 + 1/8  To approximate  the potential  loss to West
and taking  $.60  (the  1983  average price re-  Alabama catfish producers of selling in a mo-
ceived by Alabama  farmers)  as a  measure  of  nopsonistic catfish processing market, the fol-
PaC,  the monopsony price consistent with the  lowing formula was  used:
derived supply elasticities of Table  2  can be  (17)  L(PS)-  P*Q*T[1-1/2T  ],
computed.  The  difference between  the com-
petitive price  (Pac)  and the monopsony price  where  L(PS)  stands  for  loss  in  producer's
measures  both  the  incentive  for  the  mo-  surplus, T is the percentage decrease in price
nopsonist to  exercise  its  market  power  and  from competitive equilibrium associated with
the  extent to which  producers  may need  to  monopsony,  P  is  the  competitive  equilib-
be  concerned  about  the  new  market  envi-  rium  price  (P  in Figure  1),  Q* is  the  com-
ronment.  petitive  equilibrium  quantity  (a'  in  Figure
Results  indicate  significant  incentive  for  1)  and  £  is  the  price  elasticity  of supply.10
the monopsonist to exploit its market power,  Note  that  from  this  formula  it appears  that
Table  3.  Depending upon the supply elastic-  the loss in producers'  surplus becomes greater
ity,  the  potential  monopsony  price  is  11.7  as supply becomes  less price  elastic,  ceteris
to 35.0 percent below the competitive  equi-  paribus.
librium price.  The average amount is 25 per-  During  1983  (the  year  immediately  pre-
cent  below.  Note  that  deviations  from  the  ceding  the switch to monopsony),  West Ala-
competitive  price  widen  as the  supply elas-  bama  producers  sold  16.9  million  pounds
ticity becomes  smaller.  Hence,  as indicated,  (liveweight equivalent)  of fish to processors
if  the  derived  supply  elasticities  are  "too  (Jensen). The average price paid to producers
large,"  the  price  exploitation  potential  is  was $.60 perpound. Hence, avalue of $10.1
even  greater  than  indicated  by  these  calcu-  million was used for PQ  in applying expres-
lations.  sion  (17).  Based  on these  data,  the derived
supply elasticities,  and the associated  values
Producer Impacts  for  T  (based  on equation  12'),  results  show
potential losses in producers'  surplus ranging
In  addition  to  a  lower  price  to  relevant  from $.6  million to $2.4  million, depending
input suppliers,  monopsony also  implies re-  on  the value  of the  supply  elasticity,  Table
duced  marketings  relative  to  competitive  3.  In  relation  to  revenues  received  by Ala-
equilibrium  (see  Figure  1).  Thus,  monop-  bama  producers  during  1983  ($10.1  mil-
sony-induced  losses  to producers  must  con-  lion),  these  estimated  losses  are  not
sider  quantity  as  well as  price  effects.  One  unimportant and further support the conten-
way to measure this loss is to study the change  tion raised previously that monopsony in cat-
in producers'  surplus  (defined  as  total  rev-  fish processing has important implications for
enue minus total variable costs or quasi-rent)  catfish  producers.-
10The  method  and  algebra used  to  derive  expression  (17)  is  presented  in the  Appendix.  As  noted  by Wallace
(p.  582),  formulas  such  as  expression  (17)  become  more  accurate  as  the  difference  between  competitive  and
monopsony  equilibrium  is reduced.  However,  if the supply function is linear  and e is an arc elasticity, the formula
is exact.
"Evidence  to  date  is  not inconsistent  with  these  estimates.  Consider  the  following  recent  data  relative  to the
catfish  industry,  keeping  in  mind  that  in  May,  1984  catfish  processing  became  a  monopsony  in  West  Alabama
(where  most of the catfish  production  in the  State  occurs):
Farm  Prices  Farm  Revenues
Year  U.S.  Ala.  U.S.  Ala.
-- (---(/lb.)------  -----(mil.  $)-----
1981  63.8  63.8  38.5  4.7
1982  55.0  55.0  54.7  6.6
1983  61.0  59.7  83.8  10.1
1984  69.3  61.0  106.9  7.8
Sources:  U.S.  data-USDA (1985);  Ala.  data-Jensen.
Two points  are  noteworthy:  (1)  between  1969 and  1982  Alabama  farmers  received  the same price  for fish  as the
national average;  in  1984,  a  13.6  percent  price  spread  occurred.  (Annualizing  this figure  to correspond  to a  12-
month period  of monopsony  rather  than  the  observed  8-month  period produces  a  20.4  percent  price  spread-
not  too  different  from  the  predictions  of  the  theoretical  model,  see  Table  3),  (2)  1984  revenues  to  Alabama
producers  declined  $2.3  million  (29.5  percent)  from  the  previous  year;  a  period  in which  revenues  for  the
industry  as  a  whole  expanded 27.6  percent.  This  revenue  loss,  especially  if annualized,  is  consistent  with  the
estimated figures  for  producers'  surplus  loss presented  in Table  3.
21TABLE  3.  MONOPSONY  VERSUS  COMPETITIVE  FARM  PRICES  FOR  CATFISH  AND  PRODUCER  WELFARE  LOSS  UNDER  ALTERNATIVE
SUPPLY  ELASTICITIES,  ALABAMA,  1983
Estimated loss  in
Supply  Percent  producers'  surplus
elasticity  Competitive  Monopsony  difference  due  to monopsony
(8)  price  (Pac)  price  (Pa)  (T)  (L(PS))
.......................  $/lb  .......................  m il.  $
1.86  .60  .39  -35.0  2.4
3.00  .60  .45  -25.0  1.6
8.10  .60  .53  --11.7  .6
CONCLUDING  REMARKS  may  have  more  general  implications.  The
existence  of signficant  scale  economies  and
In  May  1984,  the  catfish  processing  in- n My  1 ,  t  c  p  i  excess capacity in catfish processing portends
dustry in West Alabama became a monopsony, dustryin  West  Alabamabecamea monopson  increasing,  not decreasing,  concentration  as restricting the  225  producers  in the area to  th  the  industry  expands  over  time.  Moreover, effectively  a single outlet in which to market
even in  production  areas where  processing fish.  The  theoretical  model  and  analytical plants  are  more  numerous,  locational  mo- results  presented  in this  paper  provide  pre-  m  ti nopsonies may exist because transporting live dictions  that  are  in  close  agreement  with
behavio.  In  1984,  the averag  fish beyond  50 miles may be uneconomical actual market behavior. In  1984,  the average actual  market  I  under  normal  cost/price  relationships.12
price received by Alabama  catfish producers 
These  facts,  combined  with  the  recent  em- was 13.6 percent below the national  average 
price:  a divergence  that is unprecedented  in  pirial evidence showing substantial  concen-
the history (beginning in 1969) of these two  tration  in  catfish  processing  (Miller  et  al.)
the  history  (beg n  in 1suggest  that  issues relating  to industrial  or- price  series.  Moreover,  Alabama  marketings  industrial  or-
of catfish  and  associated  farm  revenues  de-  ganization  are  likely  to  continue  to  be  im-
clined in  1984  from previous  year levels  by  portant  to  the  overall  development  of  the
24.7 percent and 23.0 percent, respectively,  industry  The model developed in this paper
a period in which the total industry realized  and attendant methodology may prove a use-
expansions in  marketings  and  revenues  of  ful starting point for attacking some of these
12.4 percent and 27.6 percent, respectively.  issues.
When allowance  is made for the fact that the  The  paper  points  to  signicant  gaps  in
West Alabama market was not monopsonistic  knowledge  regarding  fundamental  relation-
for the entire  1984 calendar year and not all  ships affecting  the farm-raised  catfish  indus-
catfish  production  is located  in the western  try. Empirical studies designed to shed light
portion of the State, the degree of congruence  on the  nature  of supply  response  in catfish
between model predictions and actual market  production are needed. Hypotheses regarding
behavior  is  impressive.  This  consistency  seasonality in catfish supply elasticities need
should increase confidence in the model and  to be tested to determine whether  an incen-
procedures used in this paper to analyze po-  tive  exists for price  discrimination.  Because
tential  farm  impacts  of monopsonistic  food  issues relating to industrial organization have
processing.  especially  important implications for catfish
Although the results are somewhat ex ante  producers, these issues will need to be care-
in  nature  and  relate  specifically  to  only  a  fully examined  as the industry  matures  over
small  segment  of the  catfish  industry,  they  time.
APPENDIX
Derivation of the equation to represent loss  nopsony pricing can be facilitated by the use
in  producer  surplus  associated  with  mo-  of the following  diagram:
'
2Recent estimates show hauling costs increasing from $ .47 to $1.16 per pound of liveweight fish when distance
traveled increases  from  10  to  50  miles  one  way  (Keenum  and Dillard).  An  industry  survey  conducted  in  1979
found that 94 percent  of the fish processed  came  from farms  located within  50 miles of the plant  (Miller  et al.).
22P  The  change  in  quantity  associated  with
MFC  monopsony pricing can be approximated from
the supply elasticity:
AQ  P'
(23)s  -AP  Q
P*  or
AP  A  / 
AQ  sAPQ/P.
D  Substituting  equation  (22)  into  equation
AQ  Q*  O  (23)  yields;
Figure  2.  Loss  in  Producers' Surplus  Associated  (24)  AQ  =  sTQ.
with Monopsony  Pricing.
In this diagram,  loss in producers'  surplus  is  Substituting equation (22)  and expression
represented  by the  areas  of rectangle  A  and  (24)  into equation  (21)  yields an expression
triangle  B;  i.e.,  which  approximates  the  desired  loss  func-
tion:
(18)  L(PS)  =  area A  +  area  B.
The  area of rectangle  A is:  (25)  L(PS)  ~  P'T  (Q  - eT  Q)  +
P/2pTsTQ*
(19)  area  A  =  AP  (Qs  - AQ),
which, upon  simplification,  yields: where  AP is the difference  between the com- 
petitive equilibrium price  (P*)  and the mon-  (25')  L(PS)  - P'QT  [1  -l2T  ].
opsony price and AQ is the difference between
the equilibrium quantity  (Q*)  under perfect  A caveat  in using equation  (25')  is that  it
competition  and the  monopsony quantity.  is  an  approximation  formula  for  which  its
The  area of triangle  B is:  accuracy is greatest for small deviations from
competitive  equilibrium.  A  precise  formula
(20) area B  ~=/2APAQ.  to measure  loss involves  the use  of integrals
Substituting equations  (19)  and  (20)  into  but this requires a complete  specification  of
equation  (18)  yields:  the supply equation.  Wallace  argues that be-
cause  of difficulties  associated with attempt-
(21)  L(PS)  =  P  (Q  - AQ)  +  2APAQ.  ing to completely specify a supply equation,
g T repre  t  t  prc  dre  the approximation  formula  (25')  may do no Letting  T represent  the  percent  decrease
worse than the integral approach.  Moreover, in the monopsony price from the competitive
..  pe  finas  indicated  in  footnote  10,  if the  supply equilibrium  price,  define:  . equation is linear and an arc elasticity is used
(22)  AP  - PT.  to represent E, expression  (25')  is exact.
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